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Face	  Recognition	  and	  the	  Emergence	  of	  Smart	  Photography	  This	  article	  examines	  face	  recognition	  as	  a	  key	  instance	  of	  the	  emergence	  of	  smart	  photography.	  Smart	  photography,	  drawing	  on	  Artificial	  Intelligence	  (AI)	  and	  Ambient	  Intelligence	  (AmI)	  manifests	  a	  ‘habit	  of	  mind’	  (Barad),	  or	  a	  way	  of	  thinking	  that	  is	  humanist	  in	  as	  far	  as	  it	  is	  predicated	  on	  human	  and	  machine	  autonomy,	  and	  representationalist	  in	  its	  quest	  for	  unmediated	  objects-­‐in-­‐themselves.	  Faces	  are	  among	  the	  objects	  that	  smart	  photography	  seeks	  (autonomously)	  to	  represent.	  By	  examining	  two	  of	  the	  principle	  algorithms	  of	  face	  recognition	  technology,	  the	  article	  will	  show	  how	  ways	  of	  seeing	  allied	  to	  ways	  of	  thinking	  that	  are	  also,	  ultimately,	  discriminatory	  and	  essentialist,	  materialise	  through	  software.	  Finally,	  if	  the	  ‘smart’	  in	  smart	  photography	  means	  learning	  to	  discriminate	  between	  classes	  of	  faces	  that	  are	  fixed,	  essentialised	  and	  ultimately	  elusive	  (the	  stereotypical	  face	  of	  terror	  is	  both	  gendered	  and	  racialised)	  then	  how	  could	  smart	  be	  made	  smarter?	  This	  is	  a	  question	  of	  politics	  rather	  than	  progress.	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Introduction.	  The	  Emergence	  of	  Smart	  Photography	  How	  is	  it	  possible	  to	  speak	  of	  the	  emergence	  of	  smart	  photography?	  What	  may	  seem	  to	  be,	  and	  to	  a	  very	  significant	  extent	  still	  is,	  a	  futuristic	  scenario	  –	  involving	  a	  medium	  and	  technology	  that	  is	  responsive,	  adaptive	  and	  able	  to	  learn	  –	  is	  in	  fact	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  convergence1	  of	  imaging,	  information	  and	  biotechnologies.	  As	  Donna	  Haraway	  remarked	  in	  her	  interview	  with	  Thyrza	  Nichols	  Goodeve,	  ‘we	  live	  intimately	  “as”	  and	  “in”	  a	  biological	  world’	  (Haraway	  2000:	  25).	  From	  the	  health	  and	  entertainment	  industries	  to	  the	  food	  industry,	  intellectual	  property	  law,	  environmentalism,	  management	  ‘and	  so	  on’	  there	  is,	  she	  says,	  ‘almost	  nothing	  you	  can	  do	  these	  days	  that	  does	  not	  require	  literacy	  in	  biology’	  (26).	  Her	  biology	  is	  that	  which	  is	  ‘woven	  in	  and	  through	  information	  technologies	  and	  systems’,	  and	  although	  Haraway	  has	  little	  to	  say	  about	  the	  role	  of	  media	  in	  and	  as	  those	  technologies	  and	  systems,	  one	  aim	  of	  this	  paper	  is	  to	  advance	  an	  argument	  I	  have	  already	  made	  about	  media	  in	  general2	  and	  show	  how	  photography	  today	  promises	  to	  make	  biotechnologists	  of	  us	  all	  (26).	  	  Of	  course,	  the	  promise	  –	  or	  threat,	  depending	  on	  your	  point	  of	  view	  –	  of	  biotechnology,	  like	  all	  forms	  of	  techno-­‐futurism,	  is	  unlikely	  to	  be	  fulfilled	  as	  stated.	  It	  is	  only	  in	  science-­‐fiction	  and	  fantasy	  films	  that	  photographs	  (let’s	  assume	  they	  are	  digital)	  literally	  come	  to	  life,	  offering	  unmediated	  access	  to	  events	  and	  individuals	  who	  engage	  with	  each	  other	  and	  interpellate	  the	  viewer	  in	  ways	  that	  Louis	  Althusser3	  almost	  certainly	  didn’t	  see	  coming.	  Nevertheless,	  critical	  techno-­‐futurists	  like	  Haraway	  and	  social	  scientists	  like	  Lucy	  Suchman	  are	  invariably	  willing	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  performativity	  of	  the	  promise	  that	  we	  have	  always,	  somehow,	  heard	  before	  –	  that	  is	  not	  new,	  but	  generative	  of	  some	  degree	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of	  newness	  (Haraway	  1991;	  Suchman	  2007).	  Smart	  photography	  will	  not	  shout	  your	  name	  because	  its	  existence	  is	  not	  a	  given.	  It	  is	  not	  a	  facet	  of	  technology	  alone,	  or	  indeed	  an	  inevitable	  consequence	  of	  the	  convergence	  of	  imaging,	  information	  and	  biotechnologies.	  This	  article	  will	  explore	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  smart	  photography	  is	  coming	  about	  and	  the	  contexts	  and	  conditions	  that	  make	  it	  possible.	  It	  will	  also	  consider	  the	  technological	  and	  extra-­‐technological	  forces	  that	  enable	  and	  constrain	  the	  evolution	  of	  photography	  after	  photography.	  	  	  In	  After	  Photography,	  Fred	  Ritchin	  –	  who	  once	  declared	  that	  digitization	  would	  bring	  about	  ‘the	  end	  of	  photography	  as	  we	  have	  known	  it’	  (1991)	  –	  speculates	  about	  the	  uncertain	  status	  and	  future	  of	  an	  expanded	  medium	  whose	  identity	  is	  increasingly	  bound,	  not	  only	  to	  other	  media,	  but	  to	  cybernetic	  systems,	  biological	  forms	  and	  physical	  processes	  (2009).	  Wielding	  somewhat	  mixed	  metaphors	  of	  the	  quantum,	  cyborgian	  and	  genetic	  image	  that	  moves	  like	  a	  particle,	  functions	  like	  a	  machine	  and	  is	  distressingly	  easy	  to	  manipulate,	  Ritchin	  reaches	  through	  a	  nihilistic	  Baudrillardian	  scenario	  in	  which	  he	  foresees	  the	  dissolution	  of	  photography	  in	  life	  and	  of	  life	  in	  photography4	  in	  order	  to	  outline	  more	  productive	  (if	  not	  progressive)	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  world	  and	  its	  inhabitants	  are	  ‘becoming	  image’	  (2009:	  25).	  Pixellated	  virtual	  realities	  and	  identities,	  Ritchin	  suggests,	  can	  be	  and	  are	  being	  augmented	  and	  automated.	  Every	  image,	  conceived	  as	  a	  ‘map	  of	  squares’,	  can	  be	  modified	  seamlessly	  and	  ‘serve	  as	  a	  pathway	  elsewhere’	  (141).	  Like	  Charlie	  Brooker’s	  recent	  drama	  in	  which	  the	  protagonist’s	  eye	  doubled	  as	  both	  a	  projection	  screen	  and	  a	  constant	  recording	  device,5	  Ritchin’s	  photography	  machine	  ‘will	  do	  it	  for	  us,	  using	  face	  recognition	  to	  remind	  us	  with	  whom	  we	  are	  talking	  at	  a	  party,	  or	  recording	  what	  we	  missed	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when	  inebriated’	  (163).	  The	  once	  self-­‐contained	  image	  can	  now	  be	  overlayed	  or	  augmented	  with	  information	  tailored	  to	  the	  viewer’s	  location	  and	  specification,6	  and	  the	  digital	  camera	  itself	  ‘will	  be	  further	  absorbed	  into	  other	  devices’	  including	  not	  only	  mobile	  phones	  but	  ‘refrigerators,	  walls,	  tables,	  jewelry,	  and	  ultimately	  our	  skin’	  (143).	  Here,	  Ritchin	  touches	  on	  a	  sense	  of	  the	  vernacular,	  the	  everyday	  in	  post-­‐photography	  that	  Geoffrey	  Batchen	  significantly	  misses.	  Concerned	  primarily	  with	  what	  he	  considers	  to	  be	  the	  marginal	  status	  of	  popular	  practices	  in	  photography	  history	  and	  theory,	  Batchen	  makes	  a	  case	  for	  the	  vernacular	  as	  ‘the	  organizing	  principle	  of	  photography’s	  history	  in	  general’	  (2002:	  59).	  What	  he	  misses	  is	  precisely	  the	  fact	  that	  this	  history	  of	  photography	  as	  key	  to	  the	  quotidian	  and	  a	  central	  ritual	  as	  well	  as	  visual	  practice	  of	  everyday	  life,	  is	  currently	  being	  written	  by	  the	  technoscience7	  industries.	  The	  vernacular	  is	  very	  much	  contested	  ground,	  and	  planted	  firmly	  within	  it	  are	  camera-­‐enabled	  objects	  and	  spaces	  that	  are	  so	  taken-­‐for-­‐granted	  as	  to	  be	  effectively	  invisible.	  	  	  
Face	  Recognition	  as	  Smart	  Photography	  The	  taken-­‐for-­‐granted	  environments	  of	  the	  home	  and	  city	  constitute	  the	  terrain	  of	  smart	  photography,	  emerging	  as	  part	  of	  a	  new	  technoscience	  called	  Ambient	  Intelligence	  (AmI).	  AmI	  is	  a	  development	  of	  Artificial	  Intelligence	  (AI)	  and	  a	  re-­‐branding	  of	  ubiquitous	  computing.	  	  It	  emphasizes	  the	  environmental	  and	  social	  aspects	  of	  networked,	  distributed	  and	  intelligent	  forms	  of	  computing.	  AmI	  systems	  that	  include	  photography	  –	  and	  face	  recognition	  in	  particular	  –	  are	  conceived	  of	  as	  being	  fully	  embedded	  within	  the	  environment	  and	  capable	  of	  adapting	  and	  responding	  to	  its	  inhabitants.	  An	  ‘intelligent’	  environment	  is	  one	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that	  can	  ‘recognize	  the	  people	  that	  live	  in	  it’,	  adapt	  to	  them,	  ‘learn	  from	  their	  behavior,	  and	  possibly	  show	  emotion’	  (Aarts	  et.	  al.	  2004:	  6).	  In	  this	  industry-­‐driven	  vision	  of	  an	  ambient	  intelligent	  world,	  ‘people	  will	  be	  surrounded	  by	  electronic	  systems	  that	  consist	  of	  networked	  intelligent	  devices	  that	  are	  integrated	  into	  their	  surrounding	  [sic]	  and	  that	  provide	  them	  with	  information,	  communication,	  services,	  and	  entertainment	  wherever	  they	  are	  and	  whenever	  they	  want’	  (6).	  Counteracting	  a	  discourse	  of	  business	  with	  one	  of	  leisure,	  the	  stress	  on	  environments	  and	  sociality	  incorporates	  but	  ultimately	  exceeds	  the	  confines	  of	  the	  smart	  home	  so	  that,	  as	  AmI	  researcher	  Stefano	  Marzano	  says,	  ‘we	  may	  find	  that	  any	  non-­‐interactive	  objects	  or	  systems	  around	  us	  have	  been	  replaced	  by	  almost	  invisible,	  intelligent	  interactive	  systems	  –	  an	  ‘AI’	  that	  could	  soon	  form	  a	  natural	  part	  of	  our	  everyday	  lives’	  (2003:	  8).	  	  	  Applicable	  to	  home	  environments;	  mobile	  spaces	  like	  cars,	  buses,	  trains	  and	  planes;	  public	  spaces	  like	  shops	  and	  airports	  and	  even	  private	  spaces	  such	  as	  clothing,	  AmI	  systems	  normalize	  and	  naturalize	  a	  culture	  in	  which	  the	  joint	  operation	  of	  marketing	  and	  surveillance	  is	  becoming	  dominant.	  Home-­‐based	  as	  well	  as	  mobile	  networks	  ‘bring	  about	  the	  possibility	  of	  surveillant	  systems	  fully	  integrated	  within	  consumer	  landscapes’.	  Within	  these	  systems,	  ‘every	  act	  of	  consumption	  and	  transaction	  can	  be	  recorded	  and	  processed,	  entailing	  the	  accumulation	  of	  an	  unprecedented	  degree	  of	  personalized	  information’	  (Allon	  2003:	  264).	  This	  ‘ontology	  of	  everyday	  control’	  –	  as	  Fiona	  Allon	  describes	  it	  in	  her	  work	  on	  smart	  homes	  –	  is	  not	  new,	  but	  rather	  newly	  naturalized.	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Face	  recognition	  technology	  is	  becoming	  central	  to	  this	  naturalized	  –	  embedded	  and	  invisible	  –	  ontology	  of	  everyday	  control.	  As	  a	  marketing	  and	  surveillance-­‐based	  biometric	  as	  well	  as	  photographic	  technology,	  one	  of	  its	  main	  advantages	  over	  other	  biometrics	  such	  as	  finger	  printing	  or	  iris-­‐scanning	  is	  that	  it	  operates	  at	  a	  distance	  and	  does	  not	  require	  consent	  or	  participation.	  Face	  recognition	  is	  a	  default	  setting	  on	  social	  networking	  sites	  such	  as	  Facebook,	  offering	  automatic	  tagging	  suggestions	  as	  the	  user	  uploads	  photographs	  of	  friends	  and	  family.	  It	  is	  becoming	  ubiquitous	  in	  international	  airports	  and	  other	  social	  environments	  where	  security	  and/or	  commerce	  are	  at	  stake.	  The	  objective	  of	  face	  recognition	  is	  to	  be	  able	  to	  pick	  out	  a	  face	  from	  a	  crowd	  and	  identify	  the	  target	  by	  comparing	  it	  with	  a	  database.	  Where	  this	  objective	  is,	  as	  I	  will	  show,	  hard	  to	  achieve,	  another	  goal	  entails	  learning	  to	  discriminate	  between	  classes	  of	  faces	  based	  on	  gender,	  race	  and	  age.	  This	  is	  easier	  in	  as	  far	  as	  it	  relates	  to	  groups	  rather	  than	  individuals	  and	  appeals	  to	  biological	  differences.	  Face	  recognition	  systems	  are	  both	  autonomous	  and	  ambiently	  intelligent	  according	  to	  a	  set	  of	  industry	  claims,	  but	  what	  is	  the	  basis	  of	  such	  claims	  and	  how	  smart	  is	  face	  recognition	  really?	  	  	  The	  methods	  and	  modes	  of	  critique	  associated	  with	  feminist	  science	  and	  technology	  studies	  are	  arguably	  among	  the	  best	  placed	  to	  address	  this	  question.	  Suchman,	  for	  example,	  engages	  ethnographic	  methods	  in	  order	  to	  challenge	  assumptions	  about	  machine	  autonomy	  (2007).	  Whether	  she	  is	  analyzing	  software	  or	  hardware,	  a	  performance	  artist’s	  AI-­‐enabled,	  speech-­‐based	  avatar	  or	  a	  seemingly	  stand	  alone	  robot	  that	  emotes,	  she	  engages	  the	  artefact	  in	  situ	  and	  details	  the	  operational	  failures	  by	  means	  of	  which	  its	  autonomy	  is	  unmasked	  (2007).	  The	  affects	  associated	  with	  such	  artefacts	  are,	  for	  Suchman,	  ‘effects	  of	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multiple	  agencies’	  including	  the	  hidden	  labour	  of	  designers,	  trainers	  and	  programmers	  (246).	  Machine	  autonomy	  simply	  does	  not	  exist,	  or	  rather	  exists	  as	  performance	  and	  as	  a	  projection	  of	  qualities	  –	  such	  as	  intelligence	  and	  emotion	  –	  associated	  with	  the	  human.	  Within	  feminist	  science	  and	  technology	  studies,	  humanism	  is	  regarded	  as	  a	  discriminatory	  way	  of	  thinking,	  predicated	  on	  a	  set	  of	  Cartesian	  dualisms,	  false	  divisions	  that	  are	  gendered	  and	  hierarchical.	  For	  Haraway,	  whose	  methods	  embrace	  ethnography	  as	  one	  form	  of	  social	  and	  scientific	  story-­‐telling,	  Cartesianism	  constitutes	  a	  matrix	  of	  domination,	  a	  story	  about	  nature	  and	  culture	  that	  can	  and	  must	  be	  retold	  (1991).	  For	  the	  physicist	  and	  philosopher	  Karen	  Barad,	  Cartesianism	  is	  a	  habit	  of	  mind	  and	  of	  sight,	  a	  way	  of	  thinking	  allied	  to	  a	  way	  of	  seeing	  that	  produces	  both	  particles	  and	  people	  as	  apparently	  autonomous	  entities	  (2007).	  Her	  theory	  of	  entanglement	  challenges	  the	  false	  divisions	  of	  humanism	  and	  representationalism	  which,	  for	  her,	  is	  the	  ‘belief	  in	  the	  ontological	  distinction	  between	  representations	  and	  that	  which	  they	  purport	  to	  represent’	  (46).	  People	  and	  particles,	  humans	  and	  machines	  are	  entangled	  in	  as	  far	  as	  they	  lack	  ‘an	  independent,	  self-­‐contained	  existence’	  (ix).	  Ontological	  and	  epistemological	  entanglements	  undermine	  the	  tenets	  of	  representationalism	  that	  allow	  humans	  to	  represent	  machines	  as	  if	  there	  was	  an	  essential	  distinction	  or	  ‘gap’	  between	  them	  (47).	  Suchman	  is	  quick	  to	  point	  out	  that	  this	  particular	  division	  is	  highly	  expedient	  from	  an	  industry	  point	  of	  view	  since	  it	  legitimizes	  the	  technological	  innovations	  that	  seek	  to	  overcome	  it,	  for	  example,	  by	  making	  machines	  and	  machinic	  systems	  more	  autonomous	  and	  intelligent	  (2007).	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Face	  recognition	  systems	  seek	  to	  overcome	  the	  division	  between	  human	  and	  machine	  vision	  or,	  specifically	  between	  human	  and	  machinic	  capacities	  for	  appearance-­‐based	  face	  recognition	  and	  identification.	  Questions	  of	  system	  accuracy	  and	  performance	  come	  to	  the	  fore	  because	  the	  comparison	  remains	  unfavourable.	  Subsequent	  performance	  anxiety	  serves	  to	  legitimize	  a	  range	  of	  technological	  innovations	  designed	  to	  close	  the	  gap,	  and	  among	  them	  is	  the	  use	  of	  AI:	  ‘AI	  approaches	  utilize	  tools	  such	  as	  neural	  networks	  and	  machine	  learning	  techniques	  to	  recognize	  faces’	  (Jafri	  and	  Arabnia	  2009:	  48).	  How	  do	  machines	  learn?	  The	  issue	  has	  been	  widely	  debated	  but	  in	  this	  context	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  in	  addition	  to	  techniques	  of	  pattern	  recognition	  and	  sorting	  that	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  the	  following	  sections,	  the	  principle	  mechanism	  of	  machine	  learning	  is	  reductionism.	  Matthew	  Turk	  and	  Alex	  Pentland	  have	  made	  a	  significant	  contribution	  to	  the	  development	  of	  face	  recognition.	  For	  them,	  ‘developing	  a	  computational	  model	  of	  face	  recognition	  is	  quite	  difficult,	  because	  faces	  are	  complex,	  multidimensional,	  and	  meaningful	  visual	  stimuli’	  (1991:	  71).	  Face	  recognition	  systems	  substitute	  the	  meaning	  of	  faces	  for	  a	  mathematics	  of	  faces,	  reducing	  their	  complexity	  and	  multidimensionality	  to	  measurable,	  predictable	  criteria.	  Moreover,	  face	  recognition	  technology	  requires	  a	  reduction	  in	  the	  variation	  of	  face	  images	  and	  environments	  and	  must	  ultimately	  replace	  faces	  with	  vectors	  (principal	  components	  of	  faces)	  or	  with	  standardized	  templates	  in	  order	  to	  learn	  anything	  at	  all.	  System	  accuracy	  and	  performance	  depend	  on	  ‘constrained	  environments	  such	  as	  an	  office	  or	  a	  household’	  (71).	  The	  face	  image	  presented	  to	  the	  system	  for	  recognition	  must	  be	  centred,	  ‘the	  same	  size	  as	  the	  training	  images’	  and	  fully	  frontal	  or	  in	  profile,	  so	  reproducing	  –	  as	  input	  –	  the	  mug	  shot	  photograph	  generated	  by	  nineteenth-­‐century	  ways	  of	  seeing	  (76).	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Following	  Suchman,	  Kelly	  Gates	  has	  identified	  the	  elision	  of	  labour	  that	  secures	  the	  illusion	  of	  autonomy	  in	  face	  recognition	  technology	  (2011).	  There	  is	  also	  an	  inventory	  of	  technological	  failures8	  that,	  combined	  with	  reductionism,	  delimit	  the	  claim	  to	  smartness	  in	  this	  instance	  of	  smart	  photography.	  Can	  we,	  therefore,	  dismiss	  the	  claim	  altogether?	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  we	  cannot	  dismiss	  it	  in	  as	  far	  as	  it	  is	  manifest	  in	  the	  very	  architecture	  of	  the	  system.	  Here,	  smartness	  materializes	  in	  pattern-­‐recognizing	  and	  sorting	  algorithms	  that	  are	  learning	  to	  identify	  faces	  by	  discriminating	  among	  them,	  generating	  ontological	  and	  epistemological	  divisions	  –	  between	  male	  and	  female,	  black	  and	  white,	  old	  and	  young	  –	  that	  in	  this	  case	  must	  remain	  un-­‐reconciled,	  reduced	  to	  a	  set	  of	  essentialised	  categories	  that	  guarantee	  system	  performance	  by	  ensuring	  that	  input	  (a	  recognizable	  face)	  is	  equivalent	  to	  output	  (a	  recognized	  face).	  	  	  
Sorting	  Algorithms	  The	  aim	  of	  a	  facial	  recognition	  system	  is	  to	  either	  verify	  or	  identify	  someone	  from	  a	  still	  or	  video	  image.	  Following	  the	  acquisition	  of	  this	  ‘probe’	  image,	  the	  system	  must	  first	  of	  all	  detect	  the	  face	  or	  distinguish	  between	  the	  face	  and	  its	  surroundings.	  To	  do	  this	  it	  selects	  certain	  landmark	  features	  in	  order	  to	  compare	  them	  with	  the	  database.	  Either	  that	  or	  it	  generates	  what	  are	  called	  standard	  feature	  templates	  –	  averages	  or	  types.	  Once	  detected,	  the	  face	  is	  normalised	  or	  rather,	  the	  image	  is	  standardised	  with	  respect	  to	  established	  photographic	  codes	  such	  as	  lighting,	  format,	  pose	  and	  resolution.	  Again,	  this	  aids	  comparison	  with	  the	  database.	  However,	  the	  normalisation	  algorithm	  is	  only	  capable	  of	  compensating	  for	  slight	  variations,	  and	  so	  the	  probe	  image	  must	  already	  be	  as	  close	  as	  possible	  to	  a	  standardized	  portrait.	  In	  order	  to	  facilitate	  face	  recognition,	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the	  already	  standardised	  image	  is	  translated	  and	  transformed	  into	  a	  simplified	  mathematical	  representation	  called	  a	  biometric	  template.	  The	  trick,	  in	  this	  process	  of	  reductive	  computation,	  is	  to	  retain	  enough	  information	  to	  distinguish	  one	  template	  from	  another	  and	  thereby	  reduce	  the	  risk	  of	  creating	  ‘biometric	  doubles’9.	  	  According	  to	  the	  manufacturers	  and	  promoters	  of	  face	  recognition	  systems,	  the	  complex	  sequence	  of	  technical	  operations	  and	  transformations	  performed	  on	  the	  face	  image	  does	  nothing	  to	  undermine	  the	  objectivity	  of	  the	  process.	  This	  is	  partly	  because	  the	  underlying	  principle	  of	  the	  system	  is	  photographic,	  and	  historically,	  the	  authority	  of	  photography	  derives	  not	  only	  from	  its	  strong	  claim	  to	  indexicality,	  but	  from	  its	  development	  and	  use	  in	  the	  very	  institutions	  in	  which	  it	  continues	  to	  be	  deployed.	  The	  history	  of	  photography	  as	  an	  imaging	  technology	  that	  is	  inseparable	  from	  the	  disciplinary	  institutions	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  is	  very	  well	  documented	  (Tagg	  1988;	  Sekula	  1986).	  In	  the	  context	  of	  the	  industrial	  revolution	  in	  Western	  Europe,	  there	  was	  a	  perceived	  need	  to	  cater	  for	  and	  control	  the	  newly	  urbanised	  masses,	  to	  combat	  and	  reform	  the	  spread	  of	  poverty,	  disease	  and	  crime	  and	  to	  render	  productive	  an	  unproductive	  population	  of	  the	  sick,	  the	  mad	  and	  the	  bad.	  A	  new	  police	  force	  emerged	  –	  alongside	  hospitals,	  schools,	  asylums	  and	  workhouses	  –	  and	  it	  was	  here	  that	  Alphonse	  Bertillon	  developed	  the	  first	  criminal	  identification	  system	  using	  photography	  in	  conjunction	  with	  anthropometric	  and	  statistical	  methods.	  Anthropometrics	  are	  broadly	  equivalent	  to	  contemporary	  biometrics,	  and	  Bertillon	  took	  eleven	  measurements	  of	  each	  individual	  criminal’s	  body,	  recording	  them	  on	  index	  cards	  alongside	  frontal	  and	  profile	  portraits	  and	  a	  brief	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verbal	  description	  of	  distinguishing	  features.	  As	  his	  archive	  of	  the	  portrait	  parlé	  built	  up,	  he	  needed	  to	  organise	  it,	  which	  he	  did	  by	  incorporating	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  average	  man.	  Statistically,	  the	  average	  or	  mean	  could	  be	  expressed	  using	  the	  bell-­‐shaped	  curve,	  but	  as	  Allan	  Sekula	  points	  out,	  it	  was	  also	  conflated	  with	  normality	  and	  the	  social	  ideal	  while	  difference	  from	  the	  mean	  was	  similarly	  conflated	  with	  deviance	  (1986).	  Moreover,	  this	  slippage	  from	  a	  purely	  statistical	  to	  a	  discriminatory	  social	  law	  of	  averages	  was	  backed	  up	  by	  a	  climate	  of	  belief	  in	  the	  quasi-­‐sciences	  of	  physiognomy	  and	  phrenology.	  While	  phrenology	  was	  concerned	  with	  correspondences	  between	  skull	  topography	  and	  localised	  mental	  faculties,	  physiognomy	  assigned	  essential	  characteristics	  to	  the	  arrangement	  of	  facial	  features	  so	  that	  a	  narrow	  forehand,	  for	  example,	  was	  taken	  as	  a	  sign	  of	  low	  intelligence.	  More	  generally,	  in	  his	  chapter	  on	  criminal	  physiognomy,	  Havelock	  Ellis	  wrote	  that	  beautiful	  faces	  ‘are	  rarely	  found	  among	  criminals.	  The	  prejudice	  against	  the	  ugly	  and	  also	  against	  the	  deformed	  is	  not	  without	  sound	  foundation’	  (1901:	  87).	  
Sekula	  is	  clear	  about	  the	  central	  if	  problematic	  role	  of	  photography	  in	  generating	  this	  huge	  and	  ignoble	  archive	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century.	  Photography	  operated	  as	  an	  effective	  mechanism	  of	  surveillance,	  recording,	  normalisation	  and	  social	  control	  but	  could	  not	  alone	  secure	  the	  identities	  of	  criminals,	  requiring	  instead	  the	  addition	  of	  verbal,	  anthropometric	  and	  statistical	  measures.	  The	  authority	  of	  Bertillon’s	  criminal	  identification	  system	  rested	  not	  on	  the	  camera	  but	  on	  a	  ‘bureaucratic-­‐clerical-­‐statistical	  system	  of	  “intelligence”’	  (1986:	  16).	  This	  system	  has	  continued	  to	  be	  updated	  ever	  since	  and,	  despite	  the	  so-­‐called	  shift	  from	  analogue	  to	  digital	  imaging,	  was	  manifest	  in	  the	  computerised	  criminal	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identification	  systems	  of	  the	  late	  twentieth	  century.	  These	  systems,	  in	  operation	  internationally,	  drew	  on	  a	  database	  of	  analogue	  and	  digital	  photographs	  and	  were	  organised	  and	  operated	  according	  to	  recognisable	  principles.	  Jacques	  Penry,	  the	  inventor	  of	  PhotoFIT	  (which	  became	  the	  basis	  of	  E-­‐FIT	  and	  CD-­‐FIT)	  based	  his	  identification	  system	  on	  the	  establishment	  of	  facial	  norms	  and	  on	  measuring	  deviance	  from	  that	  norm.	  He	  argued	  that	  faces	  are	  either	  angular,	  rounded	  or	  a	  combination	  of	  the	  two	  (1971:	  27).	  Since	  facial	  features	  vary,	  he	  suggested	  that	  it	  would	  be	  helpful	  ‘to	  have	  one	  set	  of	  standards	  or	  face-­‐measures	  by	  which	  to	  judge	  whether	  a	  feature	  is	  ‘large’	  or	  ‘small’	  (or	  ‘long’	  or	  ‘short’)	  –	  that	  is,	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  area	  of	  the	  face	  it	  appears	  on’	  (27).	  Penry	  provided	  a	  blueprint	  ‘of	  normal	  proportions’	  (figure	  1)	  against	  which	  all	  faces	  could	  be	  measured.	  As	  a	  physiognomist,	  he	  also	  linked	  facial	  features	  with	  personality,	  arguing	  that,	  for	  example,	  a	  mouth	  with	  upturned	  corners	  would	  have	  a	  perpetually	  cheerful	  owner	  while	  ‘a	  full,	  fleshy-­‐lipped	  or	  loosely	  moulded	  mouth	  in	  itself	  suggests	  a	  basic	  general	  lack	  of	  control	  over	  emotional	  urges’	  (42).	  While	  a	  traditional	  photographic	  album	  might	  still	  be	  used	  for	  recognition	  or	  identification	  purposes	  (where	  the	  suspect	  was	  not	  known	  to	  the	  witness	  but	  might	  be	  known	  to	  the	  police),	  computerised	  systems	  were	  used	  to	  assist	  the	  witness	  in	  facial	  recall.	  These	  systems	  depended	  on	  two	  different	  forms	  of	  coding	  and	  on	  the	  use	  of	  specialist	  ‘cognitive’	  interview	  techniques	  designed	  to	  help	  eyewitnesses	  recreate	  the	  context	  of	  the	  crime	  and	  search	  their	  memories	  in	  a	  systematic	  way	  (Kember	  1998:	  50).	  Geometric	  coding	  involved	  measuring	  facial	  features	  from	  images	  and	  is	  still	  the	  basis	  of	  what	  happens	  now	  in	  FRT.	  Syntactic	  coding	  used	  descriptions	  of	  faces	  rather	  than	  measurements,	  and	  was	  perhaps	  more	  closely	  related	  to	  the	  sort	  of	  observations	  witnesses	  make,	  such	  as	  “	  he	  had	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a	  long	  nose”	  or	  “she	  had	  protruding	  ears”.	  Extracting	  a	  face	  and	  thereby	  an	  identity	  from	  the	  witness’s	  memory	  has	  never	  been	  an	  easy	  thing	  to	  do.	  The	  image	  of	  the	  face	  was	  built	  up	  in	  quite	  a	  painstaking	  way,	  feature	  by	  feature	  and	  the	  process	  was	  long	  and	  arduous,	  more	  often	  than	  not	  resulting	  in	  witness	  fatigue	  –	  and	  in	  failure.	  The	  efficacy	  of	  these	  then	  new	  computerised	  systems	  was	  questioned	  at	  the	  time,	  and	  yet	  they	  continued	  to	  be	  produced,	  pushed	  through	  not	  by	  technical	  as	  much	  as	  market	  forces	  (Shepherd	  and	  Ellis	  1993).	  	  
	  
Twenty-­‐first	  century	  facial	  recognition	  technologies	  are	  embedded	  with	  this	  legacy	  of	  technically	  limited,	  pseudo-­‐scientific	  and	  politically	  problematic	  ways	  of	  seeing,	  regardless	  of	  any	  claim	  to	  neutrality	  and	  improved	  efficiency.	  Nevertheless,	  after	  the	  events	  of	  9/11,	  the	  demands	  on	  these	  inadequate	  bureaucratic-­‐clerical-­‐statistical	  systems	  of	  intelligence	  have	  increased	  exponentially.	  Increasingly,	  they	  are	  required	  to	  act	  retrospectively	  and	  proactively,	  not	  only	  capturing	  a	  face,	  and	  thereby	  an	  identity	  from	  an	  image	  but	  securing	  us	  from	  terrifying,	  terrorising	  events	  that	  have	  already	  taken	  place	  –	  and	  could	  therefore	  take	  place	  again.	  Associated	  with	  the	  development	  of	  CCTV	  cameras	  installed,	  arguably,	  to	  protect	  property	  rather	  than	  people,	  these	  somewhat	  frustrated	  and	  angry	  calls	  for	  a	  technology	  that	  has	  let	  us	  down	  to	  time	  travel	  on	  our	  behalf	  	  -­‐	  to	  undo	  bad	  things	  that	  have	  happened,	  to	  make	  good	  and	  prevent	  bad	  things	  from	  ever	  happening	  again	  –	  are	  not	  new.	  Characteristic	  of	  public	  responses	  to	  the	  grainy	  “security”	  camera	  images	  that	  failed	  to	  prevent	  the	  abduction	  and	  murder	  of	  James	  Bulger	  in	  1993,	  such	  calls	  were	  heard	  again,	  were	  in	  fact	  repeated	  with	  a	  vengeance	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  9/11.	  Then,	  the	  problem	  of	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witness	  fatigue	  and	  failure	  that	  had	  marred	  earlier	  systems	  was	  writ	  large,	  so	  large	  that	  the	  role	  of	  the	  eyewitness	  has	  subsequently	  been	  marginalised	  and	  slowly	  eliminated	  from	  increasingly	  automated	  systems.	  From	  a	  policing	  and	  intelligence	  point	  of	  view,	  the	  terrorist	  attacks	  of	  9/11	  were	  marked	  by	  a	  major	  failure,	  on	  behalf	  of	  airport	  security	  staff,	  to	  identify	  Mohammed	  Atta	  and	  his	  associates	  who	  had	  already	  been	  “seen”	  by	  the	  security	  cameras	  and	  who,	  in	  two	  cases,	  were	  already	  “captured”	  in	  the	  US	  intelligence	  database.	  Always	  the	  weakest	  link,	  from	  this	  point	  onwards	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  facial	  recognition	  has	  been	  premised	  on	  the	  elimination	  of	  the	  eyewitness	  as	  the	  main	  bug	  in	  the	  machine.	  	  
	  
It	  is	  important	  to	  emphasise	  that	  automated	  face	  recognition	  systems	  are	  not	  post	  9/11	  technologies.	  Their	  history,	  as	  I’ve	  suggested,	  is	  much	  longer,	  their	  remit	  is	  marketing	  as	  much	  if	  not	  more	  than	  surveillance	  and	  they	  are	  intrinsic	  to	  the	  new	  technoscience	  and	  its	  attempted	  conquest	  of	  the	  everyday.	  In	  the	  near	  future,	  cameras	  linked	  to	  face	  recognition	  technology	  may	  well	  be	  installed	  in	  shopping	  malls	  and	  higher	  end	  shops.	  Their	  task	  will	  be	  to	  isolate	  individual	  customers	  and	  tailor	  marketing	  and	  displays	  to	  suit	  them.	  Ivor	  Tossell	  reports	  that	  Intel,	  the	  computer	  chip	  manufacturer,	  is	  working	  on	  facial	  recognition	  systems	  that	  profile	  customers:	  ‘a	  camera	  mounted	  on	  a	  large	  LCD	  screen	  watches	  for	  faces	  that	  come	  within	  four	  to	  six	  metres.	  The	  screen	  can	  switch	  ads	  depending	  on	  the	  kind	  of	  face	  that	  walks	  by’	  (2011).	  Although	  it	  was	  based	  on	  measurements	  of	  the	  individual	  criminal,	  Bertillon’s	  system	  related	  the	  individual	  to	  the	  group	  by	  establishing	  both	  norms	  and	  deviants.	  Contemporary	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face	  recognition	  makes	  the	  same	  moves	  whether	  the	  context	  is	  institutional	  or	  commercial,	  classifying	  and	  segregating	  individuals	  into	  groups	  and	  types	  depending	  on	  their	  appearance	  as	  an	  indicator	  of	  behaviour,	  and	  evincing	  a	  form	  of	  biopolitical10	  control	  that	  is	  perhaps	  more	  effective,	  or	  at	  least	  more	  insidious,	  for	  being	  at	  a	  distance.	  
	  
The	  face	  recognition	  system	  as	  a	  whole	  is	  comprised	  of	  technologies	  and	  users,	  images,	  infrastructure,	  investment,	  labour,	  expectation	  and	  belief.	  	  In	  the	  context	  of	  social	  networking	  and	  elsewhere,	  privacy	  concerns	  are	  real,	  but	  they	  are	  arguably	  overshadowed	  by	  the	  image	  and	  infrastructure	  of	  total	  surveillance	  and	  marketing	  which	  significantly	  out-­‐performs	  the	  actual	  technology.	  While	  this	  continues	  to	  be	  extremely	  limited	  –	  by	  everything	  from	  poor	  lighting,	  viewing	  angles	  that	  are	  not	  standard	  frontal	  or	  profile,	  obstacles	  like	  hair	  and	  glasses,	  low	  resolution	  and	  expressions	  in	  excess	  of	  the	  average	  mug	  shot	  –	  we	  should	  still	  consider	  what	  the	  system	  as	  a	  whole	  produces.	  It	  produces	  faces	  as	  quasi-­‐objects,	  at	  once	  detached	  from,	  and	  conflated	  with	  bodies	  that	  are,	  in	  turn,	  detached	  from	  and	  conflated	  with	  identities.	  These	  faces	  are	  re-­‐coded	  as	  static,	  standardised	  photographic	  images	  that	  were	  perhaps	  falsely	  divided	  by	  Sekula	  into	  honorific	  and	  repressive	  categories.	  It	  was	  John	  Tagg	  who	  showed	  how	  each	  category	  leached	  into	  the	  other	  (1988).	  Sekula	  was	  nevertheless	  right	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  photographic	  codes	  established	  in	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  would	  persist.	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One	  of	  the	  algorithms	  used	  in	  face	  recognition	  is	  Principal	  Component	  Analysis	  (PCA).	  It	  produces	  images	  akin	  to	  Francis	  Galton’s	  eugenicist	  photographic	  composites	  by	  removing	  extraneous	  information,	  including	  the	  outline	  of	  the	  face	  itself	  (Turk	  	  and	  Pentland	  1991).	  PCA	  reduces	  faces	  to	  their	  vectors	  and	  refigures	  them	  as	  eigenfaces.	  In	  ‘Eigenfaces	  for	  Recognition’,	  Turk	  and	  Pentland	  explain	  that	  the	  system	  functions	  ‘by	  projecting	  face	  images	  onto	  a	  feature	  space	  that	  spans	  the	  significant	  variations	  among	  known	  face	  images’	  (71).	  Significant	  features	  are	  referred	  to	  as	  eigenfaces	  ‘because	  they	  are	  the	  eigenvectors	  (principal	  components)	  of	  the	  set	  of	  faces’.	  They	  may	  correspond	  to	  familiar	  features	  like	  eyes	  and	  noses	  whose	  geometric	  relation	  is	  then	  measured	  and	  computed	  –	  along	  the	  lines	  set	  out	  by	  Penry.	  Each	  input,	  or	  individual	  face	  image	  is	  ‘a	  weighted	  sum	  of	  the	  eigenface	  features,	  and	  so	  to	  recognize	  a	  particular	  face	  it	  is	  necessary	  only	  to	  compare	  these	  weights	  to	  those	  of	  known	  individuals’	  (71).	  Turk	  and	  Pentland	  acknowledge	  that	  an	  eigenface	  is	  ‘an	  extremely	  compact	  representation’	  not	  only	  of	  the	  face	  but	  of	  the	  original	  face	  image	  (73).	  It	  is	  a	  practical	  rather	  than	  elegant	  solution	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  face	  recognition	  (84).	  	  
	  
Linear	  Discriminant	  Analysis	  (LDA)	  is	  another	  key	  algorithm.	  It	  creates	  classes	  of	  faces,	  much	  like	  Havelock	  Ellis	  did	  in	  his	  physiognomy	  of	  criminals.	  In	  their	  survey	  of	  face	  recognition	  techniques,	  Jafri	  and	  Arabia	  explain	  that	  LDA	  ‘maximises	  the	  ratio	  of	  the	  between-­‐class	  scatter’	  and	  is	  better	  at	  classifying	  and	  discriminating	  between	  classes	  of	  faces	  than	  PCA	  (2009:	  47).	  This	  may	  be	  partly	  because	  this	  approach	  starts	  by	  selecting	  faces	  that	  are	  already	  distinctive.	  As	  LDA	  researchers	  Kamran	  Etemad	  and	  Rama	  Chellappa	  state:	  ‘First,	  we	  need	  a	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training	  set	  composed	  of	  a	  relatively	  large	  group	  of	  subjects	  with	  diverse	  facial	  characteristics.	  The	  appropriate	  selection	  of	  the	  training	  set	  directly	  determines	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  final	  result’	  (1997:	  1726).	  Sorting	  algorithms	  discriminate	  between	  classes	  and	  types	  of	  faces.	  Both	  LDA	  and,	  increasingly,	  PCA	  are	  being	  used	  to	  discriminate	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  gender.	  	  
	  
Difference	  and	  Dissent	  
Contemporary	  face	  recognition	  systems	  differ	  from	  earlier	  analogue	  and	  digital	  systems	  in	  that	  they	  are	  exclusively	  oriented	  toward	  recognition	  rather	  than	  recall.	  They	  are	  designed	  according	  to	  the	  surveillance	  and	  marketing	  imperatives	  of	  targeting,	  tracking	  and	  location.	  However,	  picking	  out	  one	  face	  in	  a	  crowd	  is	  harder	  and	  more	  prone	  to	  error	  than	  identifying	  once	  class	  of	  faces	  from	  another,	  especially	  when	  that	  class	  appeals	  to	  the	  biological	  categories	  that	  inform	  gender,	  race	  and	  age.	  These	  categories	  are	  naturalised	  through	  geometric	  coding	  techniques	  (where	  syntactic	  coding	  is	  reserved	  for	  face	  recall)	  and	  the	  default	  subject	  of	  these	  techniques	  is	  still	  the	  young	  white	  male.	  
	  
Penry’s	  PhotoFIT	  pack	  came	  in	  to	  use	  in	  the	  1970s	  and	  consisted	  of	  photographic	  images	  of	  five	  features	  (hair	  and	  forehead,	  eyes,	  nose,	  mouth	  and	  chin)	  mounted	  on	  card	  (Kember	  1998).	  He	  included	  a	  male	  and	  female	  database	  but	  established	  what	  he	  claimed	  was	  a	  universal	  –	  genderless	  –	  facial	  topography.	  This	  was	  actually	  derived	  from	  a	  norm,	  a	  young	  white	  male	  that	  face	  recognition	  systems	  continue	  to	  use	  (figure	  2)	  but	  with	  the	  aim,	  for	  example,	  of	  ‘restricting	  access	  to	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certain	  areas	  based	  on	  gender’	  or	  ‘collecting	  valuable	  demographics’	  such	  as	  ‘the	  number	  of	  women	  entering	  a	  retail	  store	  on	  a	  given	  day’	  (Moghaddam	  and	  Yang	  2002:	  1).	  	  The	  segue	  from	  disciplinary	  to	  biopower	  is,	  for	  Foucault,	  contingent	  on	  the	  increasing	  use	  of	  demographics	  and	  statistics	  that	  orient	  governance	  more	  towards	  the	  populace	  than	  the	  individual	  (2008).	  Face	  recognition	  systems	  demonstrate	  both	  forms	  of	  power	  and	  perhaps	  even	  the	  shift	  from	  one	  to	  the	  other.	  This	  becomes	  clearer	  as	  we	  track	  back	  from	  the	  biopolitical	  uses	  and	  applications	  of	  face	  recognition	  technology	  to	  the	  disciplinary	  design	  and	  architecture	  of	  the	  technology	  itself.	  	  
	  
Figure	  1.	  Normalised	  facial	  proportions,	  from	  Jacques	  Penry	  Looking	  at	  
Faces	  and	  remembering	  them,	  Elek	  Books,	  1971	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Figure	  2.	  Geometrical	  features	  (white)	  used	  in	  contemporary	  face	  
recognition,	  from	  R.	  Brunelli	  and	  T.	  Poggio	  ‘HyperBF	  Networks	  for	  Gender	  
Classification’	  Proceedings	  DARPA	  image	  understanding	  workshop,	  August	  
1995,	  311-­314	  	  
	  Koray	  Balci	  and	  Volkan	  Atalay	  present	  two	  algorithms	  for	  ‘gender	  estimation’	  (2002).	  They	  point	  out	  that	  the	  same	  algorithms	  can	  be	  used	  ‘for	  different	  face	  specific	  tasks’	  such	  as	  race	  or	  age	  estimation,	  ‘without	  any	  modification’	  (364).	  In	  the	  first	  algorithm,	  the	  training	  face	  images	  are	  normalised	  and	  the	  eigenfaces	  are	  established	  using	  PCA.11	  PCA	  is	  described	  here	  as	  a	  statistical	  technique	  for	  ‘dimensionality	  reduction	  and	  feature	  extraction’	  (364).	  The	  performance	  of	  the	  system	  is	  improved	  by	  the	  subsequent	  use	  of	  a	  ‘pruning’	  algorithm	  which	  identifies	  statistical	  connections	  extraneous	  to	  gender	  (race	  or	  age)	  estimation	  and	  deletes	  them.	  ‘After	  deletion,	  the	  system	  is	  re-­‐trained’	  and	  the	  pruning	  is	  repeated	  until	  ‘all	  the	  connections	  are	  deleted’	  (365).	  A	  performance	  table	  is	  produced,	  showing	  the	  relation	  between	  each	  iteration	  of	  pruning,	  the	  percentage	  of	  deleted	  connections	  and	  the	  accuracy	  of	  the	  system.	  The	  accuracy	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of	  gender	  estimation	  in	  Balci	  and	  Volkan’s	  experiment	  actually	  diminishes	  after	  the	  eighth	  iteration,	  albeit	  by	  only	  a	  few	  percentage	  points,	  allowing	  them	  to	  claim	  that	  the	  system	  is	  stable.	  They	  maintain	  that	  pruning	  or	  the	  deletion	  of	  statistical	  connections	  improves	  gender	  estimation	  not	  in	  a	  linear	  or	  absolute	  sense	  but	  by	  enhancing	  the	  process	  of	  classification	  itself.	  	  
	  
For	  Geoffrey	  Bowker	  and	  Susan	  Leigh	  Star,	  classification	  is	  a	  largely	  invisible,	  increasingly	  technological	  and	  fundamentally	  infrastructural	  means	  of	  ‘sorting	  things	  out’	  (2002).	  It	  is	  an	  instrument	  of	  power-­‐knowledge	  that	  is	  productive	  of	  the	  things	  it	  sorts,	  things	  such	  as	  faces	  that	  are	  by	  no	  means	  ‘unambiguous	  entities’	  that	  precede	  their	  sorting	  (320).	  The	  existence	  of	  a	  pruning	  algorithm	  that	  renders	  faces	  less	  ambiguous	  testifies	  to	  their	  elusiveness,	  or	  their	  inherent	  resistance	  to	  classification	  as	  one	  mode	  of	  representationalism.	  It	  would,	  perhaps,	  be	  going	  too	  far	  to	  suggest	  that	  there	  is	  a	  crisis	  of	  representationalism	  in	  appearance-­‐based	  face	  recognition	  systems.	  However,	  their	  designers	  and	  engineers	  are	  clearly	  aware	  that	  faces	  are	  things	  that	  ‘resist	  depiction’	  (Elkins	  2008:	  xv)	  because	  they	  are	  ‘complex	  and	  multidimensional’	  (Turk	  and	  Pentland	  1991:	  71)	  and	  not	  ‘unique,	  rigid’	  objects	  (Jafri	  2009:	  42).	  From	  the	  perspective	  of	  visual	  as	  well	  as	  science	  and	  technology	  studies,	  Aud	  Sissel	  Hoel	  is	  concerned	  with	  the	  difference	  that	  computational	  forms	  of	  visualisation	  -­‐	  such	  as	  face	  recognition	  	  -­‐	  make.	  She	  raises	  the	  important	  question	  of	  ‘whether	  the	  new	  generation	  of	  computational	  picturing	  in	  all	  its	  forms	  gives	  the	  last	  push	  to	  representationalism	  in	  favour	  of	  more	  dynamic	  and	  relational	  approaches’	  that	  might	  be	  better	  at	  tackling	  the	  entanglements	  of	  technology	  and	  knowledge,	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power	  and	  perception	  (2012:	  2).	  For	  me,	  the	  advantage	  of	  a	  more	  dynamic	  and	  relational	  approach	  to	  the	  production	  of	  faces	  in	  face	  recognition	  technology	  would	  include	  recognising	  representationalism,	  and	  indeed	  humanism	  as	  a	  claim,	  a	  defensive	  manoeuvre	  in	  the	  face	  of	  faces’	  non-­‐essential	  ontology	  and	  dynamic	  co-­‐evolution	  with	  technological	  systems.	  Still,	  this	  defensive	  manoeuvre	  matters	  in	  a	  double	  sense:	  it	  is	  both	  meaningful	  and	  material,	  reproducing	  norms,	  for	  example	  of	  gender	  in	  a	  machine	  that	  is	  learning	  to	  classify,	  sort	  and	  discriminate	  among	  the	  population,	  better	  than	  it	  could	  before.	  If	  this	  is	  a	  last	  push	  to	  representationalism,	  it	  is	  one	  that	  reinforces	  it	  rather	  than	  shows	  it	  the	  door.	  Face	  recognition	  technology	  upholds	  a	  belief	  in	  the	  existence	  of	  ontological	  gaps	  between	  representations	  and	  that	  which	  they	  represent.	  It	  re-­‐produces	  the	  norms	  of	  nineteenth-­‐century	  disciplinary	  photography	  even	  as	  photography	  becomes	  allied	  to	  the	  security-­‐based	  biopolitics	  of	  computational	  vision	  and	  smart	  algorithmic	  sorting.	  In	  this	  sense,	  Gates	  is	  right	  to	  argue	  that	  new	  vantage	  points	  can	  underscore	  old	  visions	  as	  well	  as	  old	  claims	  to	  unmediated	  visuality	  (2011).	  Like	  her,	  I’ve	  questioned	  the	  autonomy	  of	  face	  recognition	  systems	  without	  denying	  that,	  in	  conjunction	  with	  human	  input	  of	  various	  kinds,	  they	  enact	  what	  Barad	  calls	  ‘agential	  realism’,	  generating	  both	  categories	  and	  entities	  by	  cutting	  and	  sorting	  male	  from	  female,	  black	  from	  white,	  old	  from	  young	  (2007).	  In	  a	  context	  in	  which	  security	  systems	  are	  fully	  integrated	  with	  those	  of	  marketing,	  these	  particular	  epistem-­‐ontologies	  intersect,	  in	  predictable	  ways	  with	  the	  category	  of	  criminal/citizen-­‐consumer	  (Lyon	  2008).	  Since	  the	  events	  of	  9/11,	  the	  stereotypical	  face	  of	  terror	  (gendered,	  racialised)	  has	  been	  perhaps	  the	  most	  represented	  and	  most	  elusive	  of	  all	  (2008).	  If	  the	  problem,	  from	  a	  system	  point	  of	  view,	  is	  that	  the	  categories	  leak	  and	  the	  classification	  structure	  does	  not	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hold,	  the	  solution	  is	  to	  reinforce	  it	  by	  pruning	  it.	  This	  process	  of	  agential	  cutting	  and	  sorting	  strengthens	  statistical	  groups	  by	  deleting	  connections	  between	  them	  and	  is	  precisely	  the	  point	  of	  a	  possible	  intervention,	  the	  means	  by	  which	  the	  biopolitics	  and	  ethics	  of	  computational	  vision	  can	  be	  intercepted	  in	  order	  to	  make	  a	  difference.	  	  
	  
Conclusion.	  Connecting	  Algorithms,	  Re-­cognising	  Faces	  and	  Re-­writing	  the	  
Smart	  in	  Photography	  
For	  Barad	  and	  Haraway,	  ethics	  is	  figured	  as	  a	  process	  of	  becoming-­‐with	  constitutive	  others	  (2007;	  2008).	  Specifically,	  it	  is	  about	  recognising	  and	  taking	  responsibility	  for	  the	  ‘lively	  relationalities’	  that	  both	  connect	  and	  differentiate	  humans	  and	  machines,	  subjects	  and	  objects,	  selves	  and	  others	  (Barad	  2007).	  Ethics	  here	  is	  predicated	  on	  a	  non-­‐essentialist	  approach	  to	  ontology	  and	  an	  active	  disregard	  for	  the	  categories	  than	  humanism	  upholds	  –	  our	  ‘Cartesian	  habits	  of	  mind’	  (49).	  Haraway	  in	  particular	  is	  quite	  literal	  in	  her	  drive	  to	  make	  a	  difference,	  advocating	  a	  hands-­‐on	  approach	  to	  technology	  that	  recognises	  it	  as	  a	  tool	  of	  political	  intervention	  (1991).	  She	  is	  sympathetic	  to	  Derrida’s	  deconstructions	  while	  seeking	  the	  opportunity	  to	  retell	  the	  stories	  that	  technoscience	  tells	  and	  to	  engage	  in	  some	  ‘serious	  play’	  (1991).	  	  
	  
What	  are	  the	  opportunities	  for	  intervention	  and	  revision	  in	  face	  recognition	  technology?	  I’ve	  already	  signalled	  the	  operational	  failures	  and	  technological	  limitations	  by	  means	  of	  which	  the	  system	  deconstructs.	  Face	  recognition	  fails	  in	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uncontrolled	  environments.	  It	  cannot	  cope	  with	  poor	  lighting	  or	  resolution,	  struggles	  with	  facial	  hair	  and	  glasses	  and	  can	  only	  sort	  six	  basic	  types	  of	  expression	  which	  it	  must	  produce	  by	  reducing	  variation	  and	  automating	  expression	  analysis	  (Shan	  and	  Braspenning	  2010).	  The	  aim	  is	  to	  ‘recognize	  a	  set	  of	  prototypic	  emotional	  facial	  expressions’	  from	  a	  non-­‐exhaustive	  list:	  ‘anger,	  disgust,	  fear,	  joy,	  surprise,	  and	  sadness’	  (480).	  To	  complete	  what	  Foucault	  recognized	  as	  the	  inherent	  circularity	  of	  biopower12,	  researchers	  in	  this	  area	  of	  face	  recognition	  confide	  that	  ‘most	  of	  the	  existing	  works	  have	  been	  carried	  out	  on	  expression	  data	  that	  were	  collected	  by	  asking	  subjects	  to	  deliberately	  pose	  facial	  expressions’	  (489).	  Elsewhere,	  I	  have	  questioned	  whether	  commercially	  available	  face	  distortion	  software	  such	  as	  Apple’s	  Photo	  Booth	  offers	  a	  way	  out	  of,	  or	  through	  such	  circularity	  (Kember	  2011).	  It	  is	  hard	  to	  argue	  that	  it	  does	  when	  the	  software	  merely	  replaces	  one	  set	  of	  prototypes	  for	  another.	  Instead	  of	  anger,	  disgust	  and	  so	  on	  we	  are	  offered	  a	  rather	  safe	  set	  menu	  of	  face	  distortion	  that	  includes	  the	  twisted	  face,	  the	  squeezed	  face	  and	  the	  kaleidoscopic	  face.13	  Commercial	  applications	  contain	  face	  distortion	  and	  in	  this	  sense	  complement	  rather	  than	  contradict	  security	  applications,	  offering,	  ultimately	  a	  means	  to	  extend	  them.	  Nevertheless,	  face	  recognition	  technology	  remains	  over-­‐reliant	  on	  inputting	  the	  frontal	  flat-­‐lit	  mug	  shot	  –	  further	  trimmed	  to	  remove	  hair	  and	  face	  outline	  –	  in	  order	  to	  generate	  gendered	  stereotypes	  and	  generic	  differences.	  Categories	  of	  male/female,	  black/white,	  old/young	  are	  pruned	  at	  the	  boundary	  and	  connections	  are	  deleted.	  But	  what	  if	  they	  weren’t?	  What	  if	  a	  sorting	  algorithm	  became	  a	  connecting	  algorithm	  by	  means	  of	  the	  substitution	  of	  a	  few	  basic	  instructions:	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   for	  all	  connections	  do	  not	  compute	  error	  gradient	  
	   end	  for	  	  
	   compute	  threshold	  for	  connection	  
	   add	  connections	  according	  to	  threshold	  
	   until	  all	  connections	  are	  completed14	  
Software	  writing	  could	  not,	  by	  itself	  retell	  the	  story	  of	  face	  recognition,	  but	  it	  might,	  as	  Anderson	  and	  Pold	  suggest,	  be	  a	  good	  place	  to	  start	  (2011).	  The	  opportunity	  is	  clearly	  presented	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  system	  struggles	  with	  ambiguity,	  including,	  especially,	  gender	  ambiguity.	  For	  one	  research	  lab,	  the	  line	  between	  male	  and	  female	  is	  neither	  straight	  nor	  certain.	  Moghaddam	  and	  Yang	  draw	  it	  as	  a	  curvy,	  snaking,	  incomplete	  trajectory	  with	  faces	  on	  either	  side	  but	  very	  close	  to	  the	  boundary	  (figure	  3).	  ‘It	  is	  interesting’,	  they	  write,	  ‘to	  note	  not	  only	  the	  visual	  similarity	  of	  a	  given	  pair	  but	  also	  their	  androgynous	  appearance’	  (710).	  Indeed	  it	  is,	  especially	  when	  furnished	  with	  the	  additional	  insight	  that	  there	  are	  ‘higher	  error	  rates	  in	  classifying	  females’	  which	  is	  ‘most	  likely	  due	  to	  the	  general	  lack	  of	  prominent	  and	  distinct	  facial	  features	  in	  these	  faces’	  (710).	  If,	  as	  Brunelli	  and	  Poggio	  report,	  ‘eyebrow	  information’	  is	  considered	  to	  be	  amongst	  the	  most	  helpful	  in	  discriminating	  male	  from	  female,	  then	  those	  who	  wish	  to	  embrace	  their	  androgyny	  know	  not	  to	  pluck	  (1992).	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Figure	  3	  Faces	  at	  the	  boundary.	  From	  Moghaddam	  and	  Yang	  ‘Learning	  
Gender	  with	  Support	  Faces’,	  IEEE	  Vol.	  24,	  Issue	  5,	  2002.	  
	  
A	  connecting	  algorithm	  would	  re-­‐cognize,	  re-­‐think	  faces	  as	  female-­‐male-­‐black-­‐white-­‐old-­‐young.	  These	  faces	  would	  constitute	  feminist,	  anti-­‐racist,	  anti-­‐ageist	  figurations,	  performative	  images	  and	  political	  imaginaries	  akin	  to	  the	  cyborg.	  They	  would	  make	  manifest	  a	  non-­‐discriminatory	  politics	  and	  ethics	  predicated	  on	  entanglement	  and	  relationality	  if	  not	  –	  or	  not	  yet	  –	  symmetry.	  While	  it	  is	  not	  a	  solution	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  asymmetric	  power	  relations,	  relationality	  is	  a	  means	  of	  acknowledging,	  a	  good	  start	  in	  taking	  responsibility	  for	  the	  fact	  that	  ‘what	  is	  on	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  agential	  cut	  is	  not	  separate	  from	  us’	  (Barad	  2007:	  393).	  A	  connecting	  algorithm	  would	  take	  a	  leaky	  boundary	  and	  play	  with	  it	  in	  order	  to	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envision	  the	  world	  of	  faces	  with	  more	  potential	  for	  ambiguity.	  This	  potential	  is	  not	  limitless	  –	  the	  algorithm	  completes	  its	  connections	  –	  because	  classificatory	  cutting	  and	  sorting	  is	  ‘human’,	  it	  is	  what	  humans	  do.	  As	  Bowker	  and	  Star	  suggest,	  ‘not	  all	  classifications	  take	  formal	  shape	  or	  are	  standardized	  in	  commercial	  and	  bureaucratic	  products’	  (2002:	  1).	  Rather,	  ‘we	  all	  spend	  large	  parts	  of	  our	  days	  doing	  classification	  work,	  often	  tacitly,	  and	  we	  make	  up	  and	  use	  a	  range	  of	  ad	  hoc	  classifications	  to	  do	  so’	  (2).	  All	  of	  the	  categories	  that	  emerge	  have	  ‘material	  force’	  but	  the	  pertinent	  questions	  remain:	  ‘what	  are	  these	  categories?	  Who	  makes	  them,	  and	  who	  may	  change	  them?	  When	  and	  why	  do	  they	  become	  visible?’	  (3).	  	  
	  
In	  face	  recognition	  technology,	  gender	  categories	  are	  being	  remade	  in	  a	  broader	  socio-­‐political	  context	  in	  which	  they	  appear	  to	  matter	  less.	  They	  are	  a	  key	  instance	  of	  increasingly	  covert,	  invisible,	  infrastructural	  containment,	  a	  paradoxical	  closing	  down	  of	  the	  possibilities	  continually	  opened	  up	  in	  systems	  of	  biotechnology.	  The	  face	  in	  face	  recognition	  systems	  is	  re-­‐naturalised,	  retro-­‐fitted	  as	  either/or	  within	  an	  environment	  –	  one	  that	  is	  too	  hot	  to	  handle	  and	  must	  therefore	  be	  contained	  in	  the	  office	  or	  home	  –	  in	  which	  “either/or”	  is	  increasingly	  “both-­‐and”.	  But	  identity,	  including	  facial	  identity	  is	  not	  an	  accumulation	  strategy	  and	  cuts	  have	  to	  be	  made,	  categories	  have	  always	  to	  be	  negotiated.	  A	  stable	  identity	  is	  not	  a	  fixed	  and	  finished	  one.	  Faces	  are	  forever	  changing	  and	  forever	  being	  cut	  and	  sorted	  by	  habits	  of	  mind	  and	  sight	  that	  are	  hard	  to	  break.	  The	  question	  is	  not	  whether	  to	  classify,	  but	  who	  classifies,	  how,	  when	  and	  why?	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Face	  recognition	  is	  a	  technology	  of	  everyday	  control	  that	  thoroughly	  integrates	  the	  interests	  of	  security	  with	  those	  of	  marketization.	  Faces	  are	  instrumentalised	  at	  a	  distance	  by	  being	  cut	  and	  sorted	  into	  categories	  that	  re-­‐naturalise	  them.	  De-­‐naturalisation	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  making	  the	  boundary-­‐work	  visible.	  This	  happens	  internally,	  within	  the	  system	  itself,	  which	  thereby	  opens	  up	  a	  space	  for	  intervention.	  If	  cutting	  and	  sorting	  is	  inevitable,	  the	  question	  is	  not	  whether	  to	  do	  it	  but	  also,	  I	  would	  suggest	  how	  to	  do	  it	  better,	  smarter,	  where	  smart	  is	  not	  an	  indicator	  of	  technological	  (or	  human)	  autonomy	  and	  progress	  but	  rather	  of	  a	  human-­‐machine	  photographic	  system	  able	  to	  see	  faces	  as	  objects	  “both-­‐and”	  as	  ambiguous	  becomings-­‐at-­‐the-­‐boundary.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  A	  contested	  term.	  convergence	  describes	  cultural	  and	  economic	  as	  much,	  if	  not	  more	  than	  technological	  processes	  and,	  for	  Bolter	  and	  Grusin	  (2002)	  is	  another	  word	  for	  remediation	  or	  the	  mutual	  refashioning	  of	  old	  and	  new	  media.	  2	  Kember,	  S	  	  (2006)	  ‘Doing	  Technoscience	  as	  (New)	  Media’,	  in James Curran and 
David Morley (eds) Media and Cultural Theory. London and New York: Routledge.	  3	  Althusser’s	  notion	  of	  interpellation	  refers	  to	  the	  way	  in	  which	  subjects	  are	  produced	  in	  and	  through	  ideology	  (2006).	  4	  Baudrillard	  posits	  a	  reciprocal	  end-­‐game	  in	  the	  relation	  between	  events	  and	  media:	  ‘the	  ‘dissolution	  of	  TV	  into	  life,	  the	  dissolution	  of	  life	  into	  TV’	  (1983:	  555).	  5	  Charlie	  Brooker	  ‘The	  Entire	  History	  of	  You’,	  Black	  Mirror,	  Sunday	  18	  December	  2011,	  Channel	  4.	  6	  See	  the	  Layar	  app	  for	  example.	  7	  Technoscience	  is	  a	  term	  used	  by	  Haraway	  to	  insist	  on	  the	  connection	  between	  science	  and	  technology,	  theory	  and	  practice.	  Biotechnologies	  are	  exemplary	  forms	  of	  technoscience	  (1997).	  8	  See	  Introna	  and	  Nissenbaum	  http://www.nyu.edu/projects/nissenbaum/papers/facialrecognitionreport.pdf	  	  9	  See	  Introna	  and	  Nissenbaum	  http://www.nyu.edu/projects/nissenbaum/papers/facialrecognitionreport.pdf	  10	  Biopolitics	  is	  Foucault’s	  term	  for	  the	  way	  that	  power	  operates	  at	  the	  level	  of	  individual	  and	  social	  bodies	  as	  well	  as,	  and	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  state.	  Crucially,	  for	  him,	  power	  is	  not	  a	  one-­‐way,	  top-­‐down,	  state	  to	  subject	  process	  caught	  up	  exclusively	  with	  technologies	  of	  domination,	  but	  it	  is	  also	  negotiated	  by	  means	  of	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  technologies	  of	  the	  self	  that	  are	  both	  restrictive	  and	  enabling.	  See	  Foucault	  (2008).	  	  11	  With	  Multi-­‐Layer	  Perceptron	  (MLP)	  gender	  classifier	  (Balci	  and	  Atalay	  2002).	  	  12	  Biopower	  operates	  within	  a	  milieu	  in	  which:	  ‘a	  circular	  link	  is	  produced	  between	  effects	  and	  causes’	  (Foucault	  2007:	  21).	  	  13	  See	  Apple’s	  Photo	  Booth:	  https://www.apple.com/osx/apps/#photo-­‐booth	  14	  This	  is	  a	  rewriting	  of	  Balci	  and	  Atalay’s	  pruning	  algorithm	  (2002:	  365).	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